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Abstract
This paper presents a methodology to identify contagion between ex-
change market pressure events in different countries, based on a set of
seemingly unrelated probit equations. This technique allows us to separate
the transmission due to broadly defined macroeconomic interdependence,
and contagion due to herding, avoiding some of the caveats of the more
traditional cross-correlation approach.
We find evidence of pure contagion only for a limited number of coun-
try pairs which, with few notable exceptions, belong to the same region.
In some instances, a reduction in speculative pressure can be identified
between countries located in different regions. This evidence seems to
suggests that the spreading of crises can be triggered by sudden shifts
in investors expectations after an initial crisis episode and that investors
tend to discriminate on the basis of location and common macroeconomic
weakness or perceived similarity.
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1 Introduction
The debate on the nature of contagion revolves around a number of issues in
international ﬁnance, such as the development of a viable International Finan-
cial Architecture, the choice of the appropriate International Monetary System,
and the role of capital ﬂows in the development of crises. Also, it has important
implications for crisis management and for portfolio investment strategies. With
respect to the ﬁrst issue, for example, the identiﬁcation of contagion is needed to
gauge the eﬀectiveness of international rescue plans. For example, during peri-
ods of diﬀused turmoil, intervention is necessary and eﬀective only if targeted to
avoid the propagation of mayhem to countries unrelated to the country where the
crisis originated. Otherwise intervention would simply slow down the necessary,
albeit painful, adjustment process and distort recovery from the crisis over the
longer–term. A second backlash of this debate pertains to the eﬀectiveness of
investors’ diversiﬁcation strategies, which pursue international diversiﬁcation on
the assumption that international stocks exhibit lower correlation than domestic
stocks and that crises are country–speciﬁc. If, on the other hand, assets in diﬀer-
ent countries exhibit higher correlation at times of crisis, and crises in diﬀerent
countries are related, international investors will be left exposed to even more
un–hedged risk.
Despite a vast volume of papers produced over the last few years, the literature
has reached little consensus on the role of contagion in recent crisis episodes. At
the root of this controversy lies the disagreement on what should be interpreted as
contagion. Early studies adopted a general deﬁnition, which viewed contagion as
the increase in the probability of crisis after the occurrence of a crisis elsewhere.
According to this deﬁnition, it is possible to identify contagion by including the
contagious event in an equation traditionally used to predict crises, and use a set
of weights to assess the role of alternative channels of transmission. Eichengreen,
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Rose and Wyplosz (1996) and Glick and Rose (1999), for example, adopted the
above deﬁnition to investigate the channels of contagion in order to shed some
light on the origins of contagious currency crises. That kind of analysis, however,
put aside the distinction between interdependence and contagion.
In a recent paper, Forbes and Rigobon (FR henceforth, 2002) have adopted a
more restrictive interpretation of contagion as a signiﬁcant increase in the corre-
lation between international assets (ﬁnancial stocks in their paper) after a crisis
event. This deﬁnition introduces a critical distinction between contagion as such
and interdependence, i.e. a high level of cross–market correlation, which is present
in all states of the world. According to Forbes and Rigobon, therefore, the trans-
mission of a crisis from one country to another cannot be interpreted as contagion
if the operation of the channel does not change across regimes. Accordingly, con-
tagion is identiﬁed as a structural break in the crisis transmission mechanism,
i.e. a correlation breakdown. They suggest that studies relying on standard cor-
relation analysis are biased, because an increase in correlation may be due to the
large realisation of an idiosyncratic shock.1 They argue that once the correlation
coeﬃcient is corrected for this bias, no contagion, but only interdependence, can
be detected during recent episodes of crisis.
The cross–correlation analysis of Forbes and Rigobon has received a mixed
reaction in the profession (See, for example, Favero and Giavazzi, 2000, Corsetti,
Pericoli and Sbracia 2000, 2001, Dungey and Zhumabekova, 2001, and Caporale,
Cipollini and Spagnolo, 2002). One of the main caveats of studies trying to
identify a break in the correlation structure is that the separation of tranquil
from turbulent periods is often arbitrary, given that the starting and closing
dates of turmoil are not always easily identiﬁed. Also, in a correlation analysis
the correlation coeﬃcient between two assets before the crisis is considered as
1A result derived from the Normal Correlation Theorem. See also Boyer, Gibson, and
Loretan (Boyer et al. (1999)), and Loretan and English (Loretan and English (2000))
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the measurement of the existing linkages between the two countries, and the
break in the series is interpreted as evidence of contagion. However, the existing
interdependence arising through the interrelation between fundamentals, which
may be the root of the transmission mechanism, is not modelled explicitly.
In this paper, we maintain an equivalently strict deﬁnition of contagion to the
one proposed by Forbes and Rigobon, and interpret contagion as the increase in
the probability of crisis beyond what could be foreseen by the linkages between fun-
damentals. Unlike FR, we do not rely on the blurred distinction between diﬀerent
states of the world, as we formulate a more explicit role for fundamentals in the
transmission mechanism. Therefore, we try to identify contagion as the trans-
mission beyond what would be expected by the existing interrelation between
fundamentals.2
In conformity with this interpretation, we rely on the identiﬁcation of currency
crises using exchange market pressure indices and then propose a methodology
based on seemingly unrelated bivariate probit models in order to test for the pres-
ence of extreme contagion between 14 emerging market economies. In order to
measure “pure contagion”, we exploit the information coming from the cross–
country correlation between the residuals of two equations.3 Using a three stage
approach, we try to separate the transmission due to broadly deﬁned macroe-
conomic interdependence, and contagion due to herding. Finally, our approach
allows us to check the properties of the joint and the conditional predicted prob-
abilities of crises between country pairs.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we
describe where our approach stands in terms of the existing literature on the
identiﬁcation of contagion. Section 3 presents the methodology and section 4
2This approach bears the advantage of avoiding some of the caveats of the cross-correlation
approach (see Dungey and Zhumabekova, 2001), and in this respect, it is more similar to the
one suggested by Favero and Giavazzi (2000), and Caporale, Cipollini and Spagnolo (2002).
3This approach extends the more traditional tests of contagion, which rely on the iden-
tification of contagion as the impact of a crisis elsewhere beyond the effect of the country’s
fundamentals. At the same time, it overcomes some of their limitations.
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describes the empirical implementation, and comments on the results. Finally,
section 5 provides a discussion of the conclusions from the analysis.
2 Tie–Up To The Existing Literature
In this section, we brieﬂy recall some of the main approaches utilised to measure
contagion in order to place our methodology in the context of existing tests.4
A popular approach to detecting contagion is through cross–correlation analysis.
FR have pointed to the fact that sudden correlation changes are neither necessary
nor suﬃcient to identify contagion or crisis periods, since an increase (decrease)
in correlation does not imply a change in the data generating process. They
have implemented a corrected correlation coeﬃcient, which rejects the presence
of contagion during recent episodes. This evidence has not, however, been univer-
sally accepted.5 Dungey and Zhumabekova (2001), in particular, have underlined
that the results of correlation analysis may be seriously biased by the size of the
“non–crisis” compared to the “crisis” periods.6 Cross–correlation analysis, how-
ever, carries two further caveats. Firstly, the problem of distinguishing turbulent
from tranquil periods,7 and, secondly, the lack of an explicit formulation for the
role of fundamentals in the data generating process of the joint distribution of
returns. This formulation is even more important if currency crises rather than
stock market crises are the focus of analysis.
Recently, Chan–Lau, Mathieson, and Yao (2002) have suggested identifying
extreme events as those returns exceeding a large threshold value (based on a 95%
cut–oﬀ point), and using extreme value theory (EVT) methods to quantify conta-
gion as the “. . . the joint behavior of extremal realizations (or co–exceedances) of
ﬁnancial prices or returns across diﬀerent markets . . . ”. Chan–Lau, Mathieson,
4See Pericoli and Sbracia (2001), Bayoumi, Fazio, Kumar, and MacDonald (2003) for a more
thorough discussion of the different tests developed in the literature to measure contagion over
recent episodes.
5See, for example, Favero and Giavazzi (2000), Corsetti, Pericoli and Sbracia (2000, 2001).
6See, also, Caporale, Cipollini and Spagnolo (2002) for a proposed solution to this issue.
7Which should be endogenously, rather than exogenously determined.
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and Yao refer to EVT measures of contagion as extreme contagion measures. This
approach diﬀers from the standard cross–correlation analysis, because it marks
bullish and bearish periods ex–ante, as the top (bottom) ﬁve percent of the return
distribution, and then estimates the joint probability of these extreme returns.8
Recent evidence suggests that during periods of turmoil contagion is selective,
i.e. it spreads to some countries while others remain resilient to international
shocks. Correlation analysis does not conceive an explicit role for the trans-
mission mechanism which, on the contrary, has been investigated extensively in
probability based studies. This literature can be divided into three main groups
depending on the diﬀerent sources of contagion. The ﬁrst group analyses trade
linkages, such as those highlighted by Gerlach and Smets (1994) and Glick and
Rose (1999), as the main source of contagion. If a partner or a competitor coun-
try devalues, pressure mounts on the domestic monetary authorities to devalue
as well. The second group of papers considers the role of international ﬁnancial
markets as a source of contagion. This channel works through the presence of a
common lender or via the stock market.9 This type of contagion is due to liquid-
ity shocks10 or stock market comovements.11 Finally, the third group of papers
concentrates on common macroeconomic weaknesses12 as a potential explanation
for the speculative selection process. If currency markets are characterised by
multiple-equilibria, a change in investors’ expectations can cause a shift from one
equilibrium to another. A crisis in one country can trigger speculative pressure
on other countries which, in the eyes of international investors, display greater
8Chan–Lau, Mathieson, and Yao measure extremal dependence along two dimensions. The
first looks at shifts from asymptotic independence to asymptotic dependence from the joint
behaviour of the realisations of two series in the limit. The second corresponds to changes in
the extremal dependence measured by a given asymptotic tail property.
9See, for example, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Caramazza, Ricci and Salgado (2000)
and Pesenti and Tille (2000)
10See Goldfajn and Valdes (1998)
11See Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), and Kodres and Prisker (2002)
12Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996), and Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) are the
seminal papers in this stream of research.
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similarity with the hit country.13 This is also deﬁned by Ahluwalia (2000) as
“discriminating contagion”. On the other hand, if investors do not discriminate,
flight from risk will aﬀect all emerging markets alike.
A test of discriminating contagion needs to appraise whether speculative pres-
sure mounts on countries with similarly bad fundamentals to the hit country, and
whether this perception of vulnerability is indeed aﬀected by location in a par-
ticular region. Ahluwalia, for example, tests for discriminating contagion using
standard probit methodologies and three ad–hoc measures of similarity. The ﬁrst
of these measures, fundamentals common weakness discrimination, is given by
the number of countries experiencing a crisis during a contagious episode hav-
ing at least one vulnerability signal (in the early warning signal terminology) in
common with the country under observation. The second, fundamentals common
weakness and common region discrimination, is given by the number of signals in
crisis countries belonging to the same region. The third, wake-ip call discrimina-
tion, considers the number of signals a country has in common with the country
that triggered the wave of contagion (Mexico in 1994–95, Thailand in 1997–98,
and Russia in 1998).
Here, we suggest an alternative approach to testing for discriminating conta-
gion, based on the estimation of a series of seemingly unrelated bivariate probit
models over a sample of 14 emerging countries observed at monthly frequencies.
We choose as fundamental controls a set of indicators commonly used in tradi-
tional empirical models to predict currency crises, and test the signiﬁcance of the
cross–equation correlations. The correlation between the disturbances of the two
equations represents the correlation between the crisis outcome in each country,
once the impact of fundamentals has been accounted for. Hence, we can consider
this as the correlation between omitted factors. We then test for contagion using
13Two countries may seem alike to information–constrained international investors, because
of perceived common fundamentals weaknesses, or even simply because of geographical location.
Location may convey a signal of vulnerability, because countries in the same region usually enjoy
stronger trade and financial linkages or because they are perceived as more structurally similar.
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standard Likelihood Ratio or Wald tests. If the correlation coeﬃcient is signif-
icant, the estimation on the basis of the included own country fundamentals is
not suﬃcient to explain the probability of a crisis, and it is necessary to take into
account the information coming from the fundamentals of the other country.
The methodology proposed in this paper can be assimilated to the Extreme
Value Theory approach,14 but it extends it by allowing the parametric estima-
tion of the joint probability of extreme events on the basis of the fundamental
controls. Hence, we can make explicit the cross–correlation due to fundamentals
in the crisis transmission mechanism. This cross–correlation is likely to originate
from common fundamental weakness or from the fact that a shock to the funda-
mentals of one country is transmitted to the fundamentals of another via one or
more of the usual channels. Compared to the approach adopted by Ahluwalia,
this methodology does not require the formulation of ad–hoc and restrictive mea-
sures of similarity, but deﬁnes similarity more broadly. It encompasses general
macroeconomic interdependence, using all of the information coming from fun-
damentals. Also, it tests for the correlation between omitted factors, overcoming
one of the limitations of traditional tests indicated by Forbes and Rigobon.
At the same time, this alternative formulation is appropriate to a test for
contagion resulting from herding behaviour as opposed to transmission due to
fundamentals, commonly referred to as interdependence. This form of contagion,
which we can refer to as “pure contagion”, spreads because international capital
markets are characterised by an informational asymmetry arising from the limited
ability of international investors to gather all the relevant and correct informa-
14In the EVT approach, the joint probability distribution function of two random variables
X and Y - F (x, y) = Pr(X < x, Y < y) - is not known, but it can be estimated using a copula if
the two univariate marginal distributions are known. This copula is the unique function, which
relates the marginals to the joint distribution.
F (x, y) = C{FX(x), FY (y)}
The copula function C can either be specified parametrically or estimated empirically.
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tion on macroeconomic fundamentals.15 Finally, since our sample encompasses
countries from diﬀerent regions, we can also draw some inference on whether
discriminating contagion operates diﬀerently between and within regions.
3 Methodology
The simple idea behind this empirical exploration is to estimate the probability of
crisis in one country using the information coming from both its fundamentals and
the fundamentals of another country. We do this by estimating a series of bivariate
probit models, where the left hand side variable is a 0/1 dummy indicating a
crisis, and then testing for the signiﬁcance of the cross–equation correlation. In
the ﬁrst stage, we identify simple extreme interdependence, which can be due
to common factors, such as interest rate shocks in industrialised countries, to
macroeconomic interdependence, or to herding. In the second stage, we try to
exclude the cross–correlation dependence due to common factors, by introducing
the US real interest rate as an explanatory variable in both equations. Finally, we
account for a number of fundamentals traditionally considered as good predictors
of currency crises in order to draw inference on the cross–equation correlation due
to non–foreseeable omitted factors,16 which we can take as a measure of herding.
In the most general representation, the probability of a crisis in country one
and country two will depend on a set of own country fundamentals, common
shocks, and normally distributed error terms:
y∗1 = β
′
1
x1 + γ1η + ǫ1, y1 = 1 if y
∗
1 > 0 and y1 = 0 otherwise ;
15This explanation for the contagion mechanism works along the lines of second generation
speculative attack models, where multiple equilibria and investors’ expectations can precipitate
a country into a crisis. Yet, it is consistent with investors’ rational behaviour as explained in
Calvo (1999), Calvo and Mendoza (2000), and Pritsker (2000). The cost of gathering informa-
tion in an increasingly globalised world is such that utility maximising investors may decide to
adopt the strategy to follow those investors reputed as more informed. If these investors are
forced to meet margin calls, this action may be interpreted as a signal of poor returns by the less
informed investors, leading to an information cascade of the type described by Banerjee (1992).
This view is also complementary to the “wake-up-call” argument presented in Goldstein (1998),
where investors reassess one country’s creditworthiness after a crisis elsewhere, and with the
bank lending contagion introduced by Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000).
16See Greene (2003) for a full description of this methodology.
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y∗2 = β
′
2
x2 + γ2η + ǫ2, y2 = 1 if y
∗
2 > 0 and y1 = 0 otherwise ; (1)
E[ǫ1] = E[ǫ2] = 0 ;
V ar[ǫ1] = V ar[ǫ2] = 1 .
Where y∗j is the latent variable and yj is the observable for j = 1, 2. When
each equation is estimated separately, it is implicitly assumed that the errors are
independent of one another, i.e.
Corr[ǫ1, ǫ2] = ρ12 = 0 .
Under the null hypothesis the two error components are uncorrelated, i.e. no
contagion. In this scenario, it is possible to estimate the two equations separately.
However, if the errors in the two equations are correlated, because of the common
unobservable component, ω, i.e.
ǫ1 = ω + ξ1 ,
(2)
ǫ2 = ω + ξ2 ,
the correct speciﬁcation is the model in bivariate form.
In order to formulate our contagion test, we develop from the general repre-
sentation of the set of equations in (1), and proceed using a speciﬁc–to–general
approach.
Step 1 – H0 : Corr(u1, u2) = 0 .
We ﬁrst estimate a version of the model where each equation includes only
a constant. This ﬁrst speciﬁcation allows us to perform the equivalent of a test
of correlation between extreme events in diﬀerent currency markets, in the spirit
of Chan–Lau, Mathieson and Yao (2002). The two equations take the following
form,
y∗1 = u1, y1 = 1 if y
∗
1 > 0 and y1 = 0 otherwise ;
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y∗2 = u2, y2 = 1 if y
∗
2 > 0 and y1 = 0 otherwise ; (3)
E[u1] = E[u2] = 0 ;
V ar[u1] = V ar[u2] = 1 .
In this speciﬁcation, the error terms are,
uj = β
′
j
xj + γjη + ω + ξj︸ ︷︷ ︸
ǫj
for j = 1, 2.
The error terms u1 and u2 include the common shock η, the set of fundamental
controls xj, an unobservable and normally distributed error term (ω) common
to both equations, and a normally distributed error term (ξ), which is speciﬁc to
each equation. If the cross–correlation between these error terms is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero, this can be attributed to any of the three above components.
Step 2 – H0 : Corr(ν1, ν2) = 0 .
Since the error terms from step one may be signiﬁcantly correlated because
of the inclusion of a common shock, we cannot consider a rejection of the null
hypothesis as evidence of contagion, but as a mere test of the correlation between
extreme events. In order to formulate a test of contagion,17 we need to exclude
the common common shock from the error terms, uj. We do this by testing the
signiﬁcance of the cross–correlation of the errors after the inclusion of proxies for
common shocks in the estimation of the two equations. In this second case, the
model speciﬁcation has the following form,
y∗1 = γ1η + ν1, y1 = 1 if y
∗
1 > 0, and y1 = 0 otherwise ;
y∗2 = γ2η + ν2, y2 = 1 if y
∗
2 > 0, and y1 = 0 otherwise ; (4)
E[ν1] = E[ν2] = 0 ;
V ar[ν1] = V ar[ν2] = 1 .
17At this stage, we are still using the term contagion very generally. We will distinguish
between contagion and interdependence in the third step.
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Where,
νj = β
′
j
xj + ω + ξj︸ ︷︷ ︸
ǫj
.
In this formulation, a cross–correlation between the error terms, Corr(ν1, ν2),
which is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero cannot be attributed to the common
shock η, but to the correlation between the fundamental controls, β′
j
xj, or to the
unobservable component ω, which is common to the two equations.
If ν1 and ν2 are positively correlated, we can deﬁne this as negative conta-
gion.18 If the correlation between ν1 and ν2 is smaller than zero, we can deﬁne
this as positive contagion, i.e. a crisis in one country, reduces the probability of
a crisis in another country.
Step 3 H0 : Corr(ǫ1, ǫ2) = 0 .
In the third step of our methodology we test the correlation between the errors
which only include the common unobservable component ω, and the uncorrelated
equation speciﬁc part of the error. This test can be formulated by including the
set of country fundamentals in each respective equation. We, therefore, go back
to the original speciﬁcation in equations (1),
y∗1 = β
′
1
x1 + γ1η + ǫ1, y1 = 1 if y
∗
1 > 0, and y1 = 0 otherwise ;
y∗2 = β
′
2
x2 + γ2η + ǫ2, y2 = 1 if y
∗
2 > 0, and y1 = 0 otherwise ; (5)
E[ǫ1] = E[ǫ2] = 0 ;
V ar[ǫ1] = V ar[ǫ2] = 1 .
Where the error term is,
ǫj = ω + ξj, for j = 1, 2 .
A test of whether the correlation between ǫ1 and ǫ2 signiﬁcantly diﬀers from zero
represents a test of the impact of the unobservable component ω, which we can
18Again, a word of caution is necessary. Many authors would argue that this is not contagion,
but interdependence. We keep this terminology for the sake of clarity, although the term
“transmission” should be more appropriate and maybe more widely accepted.
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interpret as herding. A signiﬁcant correlation between the residual errors would
be commonly accepted in the literature as a test of pure contagion.
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Figure 1: Estimation Strategy and Scenarios
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The bivariate normal cdf is Φ2(x1, x2, ρ), where the subscript 2 indicates the
bivariate nature of the normal distribution. In order to construct the likelihood
function, as in Greene, we let qij = 2yij − 1, so that if yij = 1 ⇒ qij = 1 and if
yij = 0⇒ qij = −1, where i indicates the observation. Now deﬁne,
zij = β
′
j
xij and wij = qijzij, for j = 1, 2 ,
and ρ∗i = qi1qi2ρ. The likelihood function has the following form:
log L =
n∑
i=1
ln Φ2(wi1, wi2, ρi∗) . (6)
As is clear from equation (6), if ρ = 0, the log-likelihood of the bivariate model
is equal to the sum of the log-likelihoods of the two univariate models. To test
the signiﬁcance of the correlation coeﬃcient, it is possible to perform a simple
likelihood ratio test (equivalently a Wald test) on ρ by comparing the full bivariate
model and the sum of the two univariate probit regressions.19
Rejection of ρ = 0 is proof of crisis transmission, once we have accounted
for a set of predictors of currency crises, representing the macroeconomic inter-
dependence or the macroeconomic similarity between the two countries. If ρ is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, the omitted factors or the non–fundamental fac-
tors from the two equations are correlated. Figure 1 provides an illustration of
the diﬀerent outcomes for each of the three stages.
We can therefore estimate the joint, the marginal and the conditional pre-
dicted probabilities from the regressions, which are easily derived from the like-
lihood function. Recall that the probabilities in the likelihood function are,
Prob(Y1 = yi1, Y2 = yi2) = Φ2(wi1, wi2, ρ
∗
i ) ,
which is equal to:
Φ(qi1β
′
1
xi1, qi2β
′
2
xi2, ρ
∗
i ) .
19We perform this analysis in Stata 7, using the biprobit command with the robust option,
which automatically produces a Wald test.
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Now, we can distinguish the following cases:
1. P r (yi1 = 1, yi2 = 1) = Φ2(β
′
1
xi1,β
′
2
xi2, ρ) ;
2. P r (yi1 = 1, yi2 = 0) = Φ2(β
′
1
xi1,−β
′
2
xi2,−ρ) ;
3. P r (yi1 = 0, yi2 = 1) = Φ2(−β
′
1
xi1,β
′
2
xi2,−ρ) ;
4. P r (yi1 = 0, yi2 = 0) = Φ2(β
′
1
xi1,β
′
2
xi2, ρ) .
The two marginal probabilities are respectively Φ(β′
1
xi1) and Φ(β
′
2
xi2). In par-
ticular, we are interested in the joint probability of a crisis outcome and in the
conditional probabilities:
A. Pr (yi1 = 1/yi2 = 1) =
Φ2(β
′
1
xi1,β
′
2
xi2, ρ)
Φ(β′
2
xi2)
,
and
B. Pr (yi2 = 1/yi1 = 1) =
Φ2(β
′
1
xi1,β
′
2
xi2, ρ)
Φ(β′
1
xi1)
.
We can compare the joint, the marginal, and the conditional probabilities in
order to draw some inference on the eﬀect that the probability of a crisis in one
country has onto the probability of crisis in another. In particular, if the two
outcomes are independent it follows that
Pr (yi1 = 1/yi2 = 1) = Pr (yi1 = 1)
and
Pr (yi1 = 1/yi2 = 1)− Pr (yi1 = 1) = 0.
If the two are correlated,
Pr (yi1 = 1/yi2 = 1)− Pr (yi1 = 1) ≶ 0.
Therefore, we can take the diﬀerence between the conditional and the marginal
probabilities as a measure of contagion. In the following section, we illustrate the
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empirical implementation - data, crisis deﬁnition and indicators used - and then
comment on the results.
4 Empirical Implementation and Results
4.1 Data
We run this empirical exploration on monthly data for the period from January
1990 to December 1999 for fourteen emerging market economies. The choice
of this frequency is dictated by the aim of assessing the predictive power of the
economic indicators at a time horizon close to the crisis. Whilst a higher frequency
could underestimate the role of fundamentals, a lower frequency would not be
well suited to capture speculative pressure. Geographically, data come from ﬁve
Asian economies (Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines), ﬁve Latin
American countries (Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Venezuela), three Central–
Eastern European (Poland, Hungary, and Turkey) and one not belonging to any
of the other regions (South Africa).
Crisis Definition
Our crisis deﬁnition replicates the measure of speculative pressure proposed
by Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (KLR henceforth, 1998). This is deﬁned as,
IKLR =


1 if KLR ≥ µKLR + 1.5σKLR and
0 otherwise
where KLR = ∆et − (σe/σr)∆rt. Where e is the exchange rate, r is the level
of international reserves (both expressed in log form), µ and σ indicate, respec-
tively, the mean and the standard deviation. This deﬁnition diﬀers from the one
employed by Eichengreen et al. (ERW, henceforth, 1994), because it does not
include movements in the interest rate. KLR motivate this because of the lack
of data availability for their sample. However, there could be a substantial mo-
tivation for not including the interest rate as a measure of speculative pressure.
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Indeed, many commentators have argued that the ability of emerging markets to
inﬂuence the exchange rate using the interest rate is rather limited. Figures 2
and 3 show, respectively, the number of crises identiﬁed by this deﬁnition over
time and their distribution by country.
Right Hand Side
In order to discriminate the impact of contagion from the eﬀect of fundamentals,
we use a set of variables, which have been found to have a good track record in
terms of predictive ability (See Goldstein, Kaminsky, and Reinhart, 2000). In
particular, we use:
Real Interest Rate Diﬀerential (RIRD) A high diﬀerential between home
and foreign money market real interest rates is often associated with a
higher probability of crisis.20 For the entire sample, the US Federal Fund
Rate is assumed as the foreign interest rate. The higher the interest spread,
the higher the risk of speculative pressure (a prediction associated with the
monetary model of exchange rate determination).
Domestic Credit/GDP Growth (DCG) This indicator is positively associ-
ated by ﬁrst generation models of speculative attacks to the build up of a
crisis. Hence, we expect it to be positively signed.
M2/ Reserves (MTRG) This indicator is able to capture the eﬀect of a loss
of reserves,21 and it is often introduced in order to measure ﬁnancial depth.
Indeed, many believe that a more appropriate measure of reserves adequacy
is obtained by scaling foreign reserves using a liquid asset. The ratio of M2
to reserves should be able to reﬂect the vulnerability of the Central Bank
20Alternative to this indicator might be more able to capture the role of expectations. In this
work, however, we prefer to use this as a control variable, following closely Goldstein, Kaminsky
and Reinhart (2000).
21We use this variable in place of international reserves growth, which we have also used in
our “backstage” regressions, because it is more informative. The two are highly correlated and
introducing them together would pose problems of multicollinearity.
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to potential runs against the currency. We expect a positive association
between this ratio and the probability of a crisis.
Industrial Production (IPG) The probability of a currency crisis is often as-
sociated with a slowdown in growth. In order to control for this eﬀect,
we include the (year to year) changes in the industrial production index as
an explanatory variable. Following the predictions of the monetary model,
which associates an increase in GDP growth to a currency appreciation,
we expect this variable to be negatively associated with the likelihood of a
crisis.
Overvaluation (OVER) The excessive appreciation of the real exchange rate
has been considered in previous studies as the most important explanation
for large currency depreciations, and evidence suggests that devaluations are
often associated with overvalued real exchange rates. Other studies, such
as Husted and MacDonald (2000) and Chinn (1999), have concentrated
on estimating the extent of the misalignment before the crisis using VAR
and Panel–VAR methodologies on the monetary or on the PPP versions of
exchange rate determination. In this study, the real exchange rate over-
valuation is just one of the potential indicators of currency crisis. Hence,
we rely on a more rough and ready measure of overvaluation similar to the
one adopted by Esquivel and Larra`ın (1998), Goldfajn and Valde´s (1998)
and Kaminsky et al. (2000). We deﬁne overvaluation as the relative dis-
tance of the real exchange rate from its long–run value, computed using the
Hodrick–Prescott ﬁlter.22 We expect this variable to be negatively signed.
The more the real exchange rate is below its long–run value, the greater the
extent of the overvaluation and the quest for a realignment.
22We compute the real exchange rate as the log(S×P ∗/P ), using the US$ as a reference cur-
rency for the Asian countries and South Africa, and the DM for the Central-Eastern European
sub–sample.
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Exports Growth (EXPG) This variable controls, again, for the potential ef-
fect of a current account problem. Higher exports growth lead to increasing
levels of reserves, and they are expected to be negatively associated with
the probability of crisis. This variable is expressed as the twelve month
change in exports.
All of the right hand side variables are transformed in year-to-year log diﬀerences,
and averaged over three months in order to remove any residual seasonality and
to incorporate lagged information without burning degrees of freedom. They are
also introduced with a period lag so that the predicted probabilities are one-step-
ahead probabilities. The bivariate models are estimated via maximum likelihood.
Unfortunately, these models do not easily achieve convergence.23
It seems important to highlight some of the potential caveats of this method-
ology. Firstly, the use of measures of exchange market pressure is very popular
in the literature, but is not critique-free24. In out study, the use of monthly
data reduces, but does not eliminate, some of the problems associated with these
indices. Secondly, the use of higher frequency data would be more appropriate
to determine the presence of contagion, but it would make it more diﬃcult to
model explicitly the role of fundamentals and, consequently, distinguish the crisis
transmission due to contagion from that due to interdependence. Thirdly, as for
any nonstructural analysis, the choice of the appropriate set of fundamentals can
be critical, especially if the test involves the correlation between omitted factors.
However, in order to distinguish interdependence from contagion it is not impor-
tant whether a particular predictor has been omitted, but whether the omitted
fundamentals are correlated across equations. Finally, in order to consider all
possible interactions, it would be ideal to estimate a seemingly unrelated model
of all the countries in the sample. Unfortunately, these models do not reach con-
23Hence, we are forced to search for the joint set of fundamentals, which allows each bivariate
model to reach convergence, and the included set of fundamentals may vary for each pair.
24See Flood and Marion (?
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vergence easily in their bivariate form and a multi–country analysis remains an
impossible challenge. Advances in econometric analysis, however, such as the use
of simulated maximum likelihood methods, do not exclude this possibility in the
future.
4.2 Results
The correlation coeﬃcient between equations (1) measures the correlation be-
tween the disturbances (the omitted factors) of the two equations. We can inter-
pret ρ as the correlation between the outcomes after we have accounted for the
inﬂuence of the included factors. If this correlation turns out to be statistically
signiﬁcant, we can interpret this as evidence of contagion.
Moreover, from the lower/upper diagonal matrix of bivariate correlation coef-
ﬁcients obtained from the 14 countries in our sample, we can extrapolate further
information on the intra and inter–regional nature of this contagion. Location
may, indeed, play a role in conveying (misleading?) information on the similarity
between fundamentals.
We begin the empirical exploration by running the bivariate probit on all the
possible country pairs in the sample. This gives us n × (n − 1)/2 correlation
coeﬃcients. We follow the empirical strategy outlined in section 3, and begin
our empirical exploration by running a ﬁrst set of regressions using only the
constants as regressors. We then add, in a second stage, the US real interest
rate in order to include the eﬀect of monetary policy changes in industrialised
countries. According to many commentators, these changes may have played an
important role in the development of crises in emerging markets.
Stage 1
In the ﬁrst stage, we compute the most simple of the extreme dependence mea-
sures by running a constants-only version of the seemingly unrelated bivariate
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probit model for each pair of countries in the sample. The constants take care of
country-speciﬁc mean eﬀects. The cross–equation correlation indicates whether
two extreme outcomes are indeed correlated, and whether the two equations
should be estimated jointly. At this stage, the omitted factors include factors
common to both equations (common shocks) and factors that are country-speciﬁc
(the fundamentals). Hence, the cross-equation correlation is a simple measure of
extremal dependence and provides a ﬁrst indication of which countries are likely
to experience speculative pressure at the same time. However, it cannot be re-
garded as a test of contagion. Table 1 reports the cross-equation correlation
coeﬃcients and the respective p–values for the Wald test of signiﬁcance. Cri-
sis transmission is selective and tends to occur between speciﬁc pairs within the
region and across regions, rather than across all emerging markets alike. The
correlation coeﬃcients are often negative, rather than positive, indicating that
crises in diﬀerent countries can be negatively related, as in some cases pressure
on some countries can ease–oﬀ pressure on others. This evidence may be linked
to the argument made by Morris and Shin (1998) that in turmoil periods the
sheer force of speculation is important and, as suggested by Ahluwalia (2000),
investors do tend discriminate during times of crisis.
A ﬁrst noticeable result from table 1 is that crises between East–Asian economies,
in particular between the Asean–4 economies (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,
and Thailand), tend to be positively correlated. On the other hand, speculative
pressure with respect to South Korea is not signiﬁcantly correlated to pressure
in any of the other Asian countries in sample, except Thailand. A second result
worth mentioning is that crises in the Asian countries are either unrelated or
negatively related to crises elsewhere in the sample, with the exception of some
positive correlation of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand with Chile. Indeed, at
the time of the Asian crisis, both Thailand and Chile came under severe pressure,
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as noted by Edwards (2000).
Another interesting piece of evidence from this ﬁrst set of regressions is that
speculative pressure episodes among Latin American countries seem to be neg-
atively related or unrelated (Brazil–Mexico), except for Argentina–Brazil and
Argentina–Mexico, which show some positive correlation. Mexico and Brazil ex-
hibit a positive, though insigniﬁcant, correlation. This implies that attacks on
Brazil and Mexico, both unstable economies in the region, corresponded to at-
tacks on Argentina that, however, managed to hold tightly onto its currency
board for most of the 1990s.
In general, correlation between events in countries belonging to diﬀerent geopo-
litical regions is either negative or not signiﬁcant, with few notable exceptions
(Argentina–Turkey, and Chile–S.Africa at the 10% signiﬁcance level). Extreme
events are positively correlated within the same region mostly in the case of the
Asian countries, whereas most of the crises in L.American countries are negatively
correlated. There is little evidence of dependence across regions (Chile–S.E.Asia,
Chile–S.Africa, and Argentina–Turkey).
Stage 2
In the second set of regressions, we include the US Federal Fund Rate as a
proxy for common shocks, and for industrialised countries’ policies.25 We are still
deliberately omitting the own country fundamentals. Table 2 reports the results
of this second set of regressions. Interestingly, not much has changed within
the Asia sub–sample, where the correlation coeﬃcients have only had a minor
reduction in size. This probably suggests that crises in these countries had very
little to do with industrial country policies, but originated from troubles borne
from within the region. All of the remaining results are also largely unchanged
25We have also tried the Japanese and the German Money Market Rates, and the US,
Japanese, and German industrial production index, but with no significant change in the re-
sults. We feel, however, that the US interest rate is the most adequate proxy, given that the
USA is a major lender to the countries under observation.
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with the notable exception of the pairs Brazil–Argentina and Mexico–Argentina,
which are now insigniﬁcantly correlated. Events in Mexico and Brazil, which
were previously positively but not signiﬁcantly correlated, are now negatively, but
signiﬁcantly, correlated. This may be due to the fact that common shocks were
at the root of the earlier detected positive correlation and that these countries
were greatly aﬀected by interest rate policies in the USA.26
Stage 3
In the third and ﬁnal stage, we include the set of fundamental controls with the
aim that the correlation between omitted factors will capture non–fundamental
factors only, i.e. herding, or correlation between extreme events unmotivated by
fundamentals’ interdependence. Table 3 presents the cross–equation correlation
coeﬃcients of the last set of regressions. The comparison of the results obtained
in stage two and the ones obtained in stage three, allows the distinction between
extreme interdependence and extreme contagion. In this last stage, the picture
depicted by tables 1 and 2 changes quite dramatically. Very few of the corre-
lation coeﬃcients remain signiﬁcant after the introduction of the own country
fundamentals. For example, the top left quadrant of the table suggests that most
of the dependence within Asia was due to fundamental interdependence. In the
terminology of Masson (1999), this means that for these countries it is more ap-
propriate to talk about spillovers rather than pure contagion, with the notable
exception of the Malaysia–Philippines pairing, where dependence does not seem
to be accounted for by fundamentals’ interdependence, and can probably be im-
puted to herding. The earlier negative interdependence between Asia and the
rest of the sample, and Latin America in particular, seems now to have van-
ished. This indicates that the negative correlation coeﬃcients were probably due
to the negative correlation between fundamentals, with the exception of Chile
26I.e. change in monetary policy in the USA triggers generalised attacks on these countries.
Some commentators would argue that this evidence provides a further case for dollarisation.
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which maintains positive, but not signiﬁcant at standard conﬁdence levels, cor-
relations with some Asian countries. Speculative pressure in Argentina continues
to be negatively related to pressure onto Korea and Malaysia, and so it is for
Korea with Mexico, Venezuela, and S.Africa, and Hungary and Turkey with the
Philippines.
Within Latin America there are two further cases of positive contagion be-
tween the pairs Argentina–Mexico and Argentina–Venezuela, both at the 10%
signiﬁcance level. The remaining correlation coeﬃcients within the region are
either not signiﬁcant or negatively related. As before, there is no evidence of con-
tagion from any of the Latin American countries to the rest of the sample, imply-
ing that the previously detected (weak) correlation between Chile and S.Africa
and Argentina and Turkey was probably due to some form of positive correlation
between fundamentals.
In general, table 3 suggests that herding is limited to only a handful of cases
between countries belonging to the same region, whereas most of the evidence
between countries in diﬀerent regions is of negative herding.
Joint, Marginal And Conditional Predicted Probabilities
The comparison of the joint, marginal, and conditional probabilities of crises for
each country pair provides a measurement of the extent of the transmission. If the
crisis outcomes in the two countries are independent, the conditional probability
of speculative pressure on one country conditional on speculative pressure on
another will not be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from its marginal probability, implying
that the informational content descending from the other country is irrelevant.
In order to illustrate this approach we concentrate on some of the most repre-
sentative cases. Figures 4 and 5 plot, respectively, the joint and the conditional
probabilities of crisis of the Asian countries in sample versus Thailand, considered
as the crisis originator in 1997. The predicted joint probabilities are all close to
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zero for most of the period under observation, but increase markedly immediately
after the eruption of the Asian crisis. This increase is gradual for the probability
predicted from the stage two regressions, but it is captured by a spike for the
joint probabilities from the full model. The conditional probabilities exhibit a
similar behaviour when computed on the full model in the third stage of regres-
sions, but a distinction emerges from stage two. In stage two, the Malaysia and
Philippines probabilities, conditional on an event in Thailand, exhibit an almost
identical (albeit with diﬀerent size) decay during the second part of the 1990s,
which counteracts the spikes of the conditional probabilities of stage three. In
contrast, the conditional probabilities for Indonesia and Korea go up together
in the second half of the 1990s and reach their maximum around 1998. How-
ever, these extreme outcomes are signiﬁcantly correlated only in the ﬁrst and the
second stage, and there is no signiﬁcant correlation after the inclusion of funda-
mentals. This means that the correlation coeﬃcient in the ﬁrst two stages were
capturing the correlation between fundamentals, or interdependence. This result
is not surprising because it classiﬁes countries as belonging to the same region,
and can be interpreted as evidence in support of the spillover eﬀects mentioned
by Masson (1999).
Malaysia and Philippines, for example, exhibit signiﬁcant extreme correlation
(according to the Wald test) in all three forms of the bivariate model. Quadrant
A of ﬁgure 6 plots the predicted joint crisis probability in these two countries
computed in each of the three stages. The joint probability from the ﬁrst two
stages is signiﬁcant, but fairly constant throughout the 1990s. When the funda-
mentals are included, the joint crisis probability peaks at the time of the Asian
crisis, rising to 28% in correspondence to July–August 1997. Quadrants B, C
and D show the probability of crisis in the Philippines conditional on a crisis in
Malaysia estimated using the three speciﬁcations described in section 3. Whereas
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quadrant C tells us how much the conditional probability diﬀers (increases) with
respect to the marginal probability because of the correlation between both the
fundamentals and the omitted factors, quadrant D reﬂects more the change due
to the correlation between omitted factors.27 In all three cases, the conditional
probability is considerably and signiﬁcantly greater than the marginal probability.
Quadrant D plots the probabilities predicted from the full model. The marginal
probability of a crisis in the Philippines remains generally low throughout the
period, with a small peak right at the time of the Asian crisis. The conditional
probability from the full model, however, exhibits greater variability than in the
other two stages, it rises well before the Asian crisis and drops suddenly just after
it, mimicking the exchange market mayhem of that period.
Among the Asian countries, crises in South Korea seem to be inﬂuenced only
by crises in Thailand, but the correlation disappears when we include the full
set of fundamentals. Instead, speculative pressure on South Korea seems to be
unrelated to speculative pressure elsewhere in the region. As an example, ﬁgure
7 shows the predicted joint, conditional and marginal probabilities of Korea vs.
the Philippines. This pair exhibits a very low joint probability of crisis not rising
beyond 5% and, as it can be seen from quadrant D, there is no distinction between
the conditional and the marginal probabilities, once the full set of fundamentals
is introduced in the third stage.
Figure 9 presents the example of Indonesia and Poland, as a case diametrically
opposite to that of the Philippines and Malaysia in ﬁgure 6. Tables 1 and 2 show
that these two countries are characterised by anti–correlated events. The negative
correlation coeﬃcient looses its signiﬁcance when fundamentals are included in
the model (see table 3). We can see from ﬁgure 9 that these two countries have a
minuscule probability of ending up in a crisis at the same time (see quadrant A of
27This approach carries the same limitation of any non–structural approach, i.e. it is always
possible that some relevant fundamentals will not be included in the analysis. However, in this
context, this would represent a limitation only if the excluded fundamentals were correlated
across countries
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the ﬁgure) and the marginal probability of a crisis in Indonesia is always greater
than its probability conditional on a crisis in Poland. Quadrant D, in particular,
shows that when the events in the two countries are unrelated, as indicated by the
the Wald test on the correlation coeﬃcient, the conditional probability is almost
impossible to discern from the marginal probability.
It is also interesting to look at the case of Chile, which adopted capital controls
during most of the 1990s. Edwards (2000) highlights that Chile fell under intense
pressure together with some Asian economies, and Thailand in particular. This
evidence is supported by our correlation tables. Figure 8 shows in panel A how
Chile and Thailand tended to come under speculative pressure at the same time.
The conditional probabilities in quadrant C and D are persistently greater than
the marginal probability. However, according to the Wald test, the correlation
coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant after the inclusion of fundamentals. On the other
hand, Chile does not seem to be aﬀected by crises occurring in the same region.
For example, ﬁgure 11 considers the predicted probabilities of a crisis in Chile vs.
Venezuela. These two countries exhibit very small joint probabilities of crisis and
the marginal probability of a crisis in Chile is always greater than the probability
conditional on a crisis in Venezuela. A similar pattern can be noticed in ﬁgure
12, where it is represented the case of Chile and Mexico.
The case of Argentina is also interesting, because it is a country that managed
to maintain a currency board throughout the 1990s. Tables 1 to 3 highlight the
presence of extreme contagion between Argentina and Mexico. Figure 10 shows
that the probability of a crisis in Argentina conditional on a crisis in Mexico,
a country often at the center of turmoil, is always greater than its marginal
probability. These results show a resilience of the Argentinean currency board to
contagion during this period, which contrasts with the instability at the beginning
of the 2000s.
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5 Conclusions
Identifying contagion is one of the critical issues in the current debate on currency
crises. Although the literature on this topic has increased exponentially, little
consensus has been reached on the identiﬁcation of contagion in recent episodes.
A common but controversial approach to measuring contagion uses correlation
analysis of returns. More recently, extreme value theory methods have been
suggested as a way to measure the correlation between extreme events and detect
extreme contagion. These approaches, however, do not model explicitly the role of
fundamentals and do not allow the investigation of the channels of transmission.
In this empirical exercise we interpret contagion as the increase in the proba-
bility of crisis beyond what could be foreseen by the linkages between fundamentals,
and propose an alternative methodology. We are able to estimate an extremal
dependence measure and model explicitly the role of fundamentals, allowing the
distinction between extreme interdependence and extreme contagion. This ap-
proach consists of estimating a series of seemingly unrelated bivariate probit
models between country pairs for a sample of emerging markets observed during
the 1990s. Our test of contagion consists of a test of the signiﬁcance of the cor-
relation between the cross–equation errors, the omitted factors. Under the null
hypothesis of no contagion, the two country-speciﬁc equations can be estimated
separately. Rejection of the null hypothesis implies that estimating the model in
its bivariate form yields a greater predictive power. Running this test before and
after the introduction of a set of fundamental controls, we are able to distinguish
the extremal dependence due to the correlation between fundamentals, or inter-
dependence, and the dependence due to the correlation between omitted factors,
or “pure contagion”.
We ﬁnd evidence of contagion for few cases and generally between countries
belonging to the same region. In some instances, it is possible to identify a re-
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duction of speculative pressure, especially between countries located in diﬀerent
regions. However, it seems that most of the extreme dependence is due to ex-
treme interdependence. On this evidence, it cannot be ruled out that speculators
discriminate on the basis of location and common macroeconomic weakness or
perceived similarity. This argument supports the view that crises in emerging
markets can be generated by sudden shifts in investors’ conﬁdence. The cost of
gathering information at the global level makes these sudden shifts more likely
by increasing the asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors.
These results carry some interesting policy implications. First, in order to
assess the vulnerability of country, market participants and policymakers need to
discount the state of fundamentals in other countries, in particular those belong-
ing to the same region. Early warning systems need to monitor more carefully
those countries with stronger existing linkages. However, contagion can occur
without the presence of existing linkages, and international intervention may be
required to limit the undue spreading of crises to “innocent” countries.
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6 Data Appendix
Exchange Rate Nominal Exchange Rate expressed in national currency unit
per US$, line ..AE.. IMF–IFS CD-Rom.
Real Interest Rate Diﬀerential The diﬀerential between the home and the
foreign (US$) money market interest rate, deﬂated using consumer price
inﬂation. The interest rate is line 60, and the consumer price index is line
64 from the IMF–IFS CD-Rom.
Reserves International reserves are taken from line ..1L.. of IFS-IMF CD-ROM
Industrial Production Industrial production growth. The Industrial Produc-
tion Index is the line 66 from IFS-IMF CD-Rom.
Overvaluation This is an ad-hoc built measure of misalignment. We deﬁne
the real exchange rate as rer=log(e)+log(p*)-log(p) computed using the
consumer price indices and the USA as a foreign country. We apply an
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter to the real exchange rate in order to compute the
“long-run” value and deﬁne the misalignment as the relative diﬀerence be-
tween the actual and the predicted real exchange rate.
Exports Exports (in US$ value) line ..70.. IFS-IMF CD-Rom
M2/Reserves Ratio of M2 to Reserves. M2 is the sum of lines ..34.. and ..35..
(converted in US$) divided by line ..1L.. from IFS-IMF CD-ROM.
Domestic Credit Ratio of Domestic Credit to GDP. Domestic Credit is line
..32..from the IFS-IMF CD-Rom. GDP is interpolated from line ..99B..
from the IMF-IFS CD-Rom and OECD CD-Rom (where missing)
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Table 1: Stage 1 - Bivariate Probit Correlations
Constants Only Korea Malaysia Indonesia Thailand Philippines Brazil Argentina Chile Mexico Venezuela Poland Hungary Turkey
Malaysia 0.631
(0.112) - SE Asia
Indonesia 0.603 0.684
(0.124) (0.012) -
Thailand 0.992 0.722 0.816
(0.000) (0.009) (0.002) -
Philippines 0.603 0.909 0.643 0.684
(0.124) (0.000) (0.016) (0.012) -
Brazil -0.790 -0.831 -0.838 -0.831 0.153
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.615) -
Argentina -0.770 -0.806 -0.817 -0.806 -0.817 0.700 Latin America
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) -
Chile 0.603 0.499 0.643 0.684 0.457 -0.838 -0.817
(0.124) (0.081) (0.016) (0.012) (0.103) (0.000) (0.000) -
Mexico -0.770 0.309 -0.817 -0.806 -0.817 0.238 0.629 -0.817
(0.000) (0.345) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.452) (0.039) (0.000) -
Venezuela -0.770 -0.806 -0.817 -0.806 -0.817 -0.824 -0.812 -0.817 -0.812
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) -
Poland -0.784 -0.825 -0.832 -0.825 -0.832 0.153 -0.817 -0.832 -0.817 -0.817
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.615) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) - CE Europe
Hungary -0.770 -0.806 -0.817 -0.806 -0.817 0.514 0.629 -0.817 0.352 0.352 0.272
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.075) (0.039) (0.000) (0.292) (0.292) (0.398) -
Turkey 0.555 -0.837 0.121 0.161 -0.843 0.08 0.483 -0.843 0.208 0.208 -0.843 0.208
(0.150) (0.000) (0.685) (0.596) (0.000) (0.770) (0.090) (0.000) (0.506) (0.506) (0.000) (0.506) -
S. Africa -0.770 -0.806 0.272 0.309 -0.817 -0.824 -0.812 0.548 -0.812 0.352 -0.817 0.352 0.208
(0.000) (0.000) (0.398) (0.345) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.061) (0.000) (0.292) (0.000) (0.292) (0.506)
Wald Test of ρ = 0
p-values in parentheses
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Table 2: Stage 2 - Bivariate Probit Correlations
Common Shocks Korea Malaysia Indonesia Thailand Philippines Brazil Argentina Chile Mexico Venezuela Poland Hungary Turkey
Malaysia 0.582
(0.180) -
Indonesia 0.445 0.676 SE Asia
(0.278) (0.026) -
Thailand 0.990 0.698 0.722
(0.000) (0.019) (0.011) -
Philippines 0.581 0.905 0.678 0.696
(0.178) (0.000) (0.024) (0.018) -
Brazil -0.799 -0.818 -0.913 -0.865 0.246
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.444) - Latin America
Argentina -0.531 -0.787 -0.506 -0.611 -0.801 0.400
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.247) -
Chile 0.479 0.426 0.483 0.565 0.410 -0.841 -0.792
(0.272) (0.138) (0.105) (0.050) (0.141) (0.000) (0.000) -
Mexico -0.511 0.368 -0.530 -0.611 -0.813 -0.812 0.544 -0.837
(0.000) (0.283) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.134) (0.000) -
Venezuela -0.647 -0.831 -0.695 -0.747 -0.832 -0.806 -0.800 -0.858 -0.805
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) -
Poland -0.737 -0.816 -0.803 -0.832 -0.841 0.135 -0.800 -0.821 -0.808 -0.814 CE Europe
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.649) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) -
Hungary -0.807 -0.841 -0.859 -0.874 -0.837 0.394 0.556 -0.870 0.444 0.381 0.381
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.226) (0.133) (0.000) (0.206) (0.249) (0.278) -
Turkey 0.580 -0.856 0.022 0.128 -0.852 0.147 0.615 -0.892 0.269 0.202 -0.880 0.289
(0.187) (0.000) (0.946) (0.722) (0.000) (0.627) (0.043) (0.000) (0.384) (0.513) (0.000) (0.343) -
S. Africa -0.877 -0.846 0.101 0.191 -0.839 -0.818 -0.792 0.537 -0.809 0.343 -0.838 0.422 0.215
(0.000) (0.000) (0.777) (0.584) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.050) (0.000) (0.306) (0.000) (0.203) (0.475)
Wald Test of ρ = 0
p-values in parentheses
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Table 3: Stage 3 - Bivariate Probit Correlations
Full Model Korea Malaysia Indonesia Thailand Philippines Brazil Argentina Chile Mexico Venezuela Poland Hungary Turkey
Malaysia 0.375
(0.392) - SE Asia
Indonesia -0.734 0.431
(0.423) (0.502) -
Thailand 0.154 -0.358 0.424
(0.662) (0.317) (0.253) -
Philippines 0.085 0.823 0.397 0.519
(0.847) (0.000) (0.428) (0.323) -
Brazil -0.843 -0.026 -0.339 -0.413 -0.756
(0.105) (0.985) (0.394) (0.116) (0.110) -
Argentina -0.916 -0.938 0.010 -0.154 -0.010 -0.781 Latin America
(0.000) (0.000) (0.961) (0.573) (0.984) (0.118) -
Chile 0.081 0.493 0.998 0.879 0.999 -0.980 -0.827
(0.889) (0.166) (0.146) (0.223) (0.106) (0.030) (0.000) -
Mexico -0.875 0.787 -0.077 -0.403 -0.267 -0.191 0.645 -0.899
(0.000) (0.752) (0.793) (0.206) (0.125) (0.140) (0.066) (0.352) -
Venezuela -0.963 -0.772 -0.390 -0.473 0.153 -0.424 0.618 -0.972 -0.548
(0.000) (0.127) (0.537) (0.230) (0.902) (0.177) (0.096) (0.000) (0.026) -
Poland -0.998 -0.689 -0.4651 -0.064 -0.932 0.318 -0.166 -0.925 -0.569 -0.523
(0.417) (0.430) (0.032) (0.737) (0.241) (0.327) (0.626) (0.000) (0.003) (0.083) - CE Europe
Hungary 0.997 -0.411 -0.998 -0.948 -0.978 0.999 0.999 -0.968 -0.058 -0.976 -0.130
(0.589) (0.839) (0.644) (0.518) (0.020) (0.750) (0.915) (0.025) (0.945) (0.013) (0.767) -
Turkey 0.686 -0.998 -0.715 -0.027 -0.980 -0.969 -0.811 -0.983 0.457 0.494 -0.810 -0.255
(0.164) (0.334) (0.369) (0.947) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.424) (0.193) (0.125) (0.806) -
S. Africa -0.978 -0.999 0.418 0.732 0.295 -0.931 -0.963 0.999 -0.513 0.087 -0.993 0.999 1
(0.012) (0.688) (0.354) (0.608) (0.722) (0.350) (0.000) (0.935) (0.327) (0.837) (0.072) (0.952) (0.245)
Wald Test of ρ = 0
p-values in parentheses
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Figure 2: Number of IKLR Crises (1990,2-1999,12)
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Figure 4: Asian countries vs. Thailand - Joint Probabilities
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Figure 5: Asian countries vs. Thailand - Conditional Probabilities
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Figure 6: Philippines vs. Malaysia - Joint, Conditional, and Marginal Probabilities
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Figure 7: Korea vs. Philippines - Joint, Conditional and Marginal Probabilities
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Figure 8: Chile vs. Thailand - Joint, Conditional and Marginal Probabilities
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Figure 9: Indonesia vs. Poland - Joint, Conditional and Marginal Probabilities
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Figure 10: Argentina vs. Mexico - Joint, Conditional and Marginal Probabilities
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Figure 11: Chile vs. Venezuela - Joint, Conditional, and Marginal Probabilities
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Figure 12: Chile vs. Mexico - Joint, Conditional, and Marginal Probabilities
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